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Financial Privacy
Gregory T. Nojeim*
INTRODUCTION
Thank you for inviting me to speak on behalf of the American
Civil Liberties Union' about financial privacy and the Financial
2Services Modernization Act. I was one of the of people who lobbied
Congress for the broadest possible privacy protections in that
legislation, and I hope to contribute to the panel discussion something
of a report from Washington.
I. FINANCIAL PRIVACY AND FAIR INFORMATION
PRACTICES
Privacy advocates came together in an "odd bedfellows"
coalition to oppose the Financial Services Modernization Act - it
was re-named at final passage, the "Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act" ("G-L-
B"). We argued that the bill threatened consumer privacy. It did this
by removing the walls that separate the business of insurance
companies, banks and securities firms; and thus, facilitated the flow
of personal financial information among them.3  These walls had
afforded de facto privacy protection. The limited privacy provisions
in the bill did not go far enough to replace the protection that they
provided.
. Associate Director and Chief Legislative Counsel, American Civil Liberties
Union, Washington National Office.
1 The ACLU is a nation-wide, non-profit, non-partisan organization of over
250,000 people dedicated to protecting the principles of freedom set forth in the Bill of
Rights.
2 Graham-Leach-Bliley Act, Pub. L. No. 106-102.
3 The ACLU took no position on the merits of the financial modernization
legislation overall, and whether in particular, insurance companies, banks, and the
securities firms should be able to affiliate more readily. Instead, we argued that if the legal
walls separating these businesses were to be removed, they ought to be replaced with
privacy rights that would allow consumers to control the flow of their personal
information among the affiliated entities.
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Believe me, when the ACLU, the Eagle Forum, the Free
Congress Foundation and Ralph Nader all agree on something, it is
time to stand up and take notice. The coalition came together around
four principles of fair information practices:
* Notice as to what personal financial information is being
collected;
* Access to the information to ensure accuracy;
" Control over dissemination of the information; and
* Non-pre-emption of state laws that provide superior financial
privacy protection.
We have been advocating these principles for some time. They reflect
what could be called the Golden Rule of informational privacy:
sensitive personal information given for one purpose ought not be
used for other purposes without the express consent of the person to
whom the information relates.
II. PRIVACY PROTECTION IN THE LEGISLATION
Congressional debate on the privacy provisions in the Gramm-
Leach-Bliley Act was extensive, heated and divisive. Regarding the
provisions, Rep. Sue Kelly (R-NY) said: " . . . [T]his legislation
represents the greatest expansion of personal financial privacy in the
history of American finance ...", Contrarily, Rep. John Dingell (D-
MI) commented: ". . . the privacy protections in [G-L-B] are at best a
sham .... The only thing the banks are going to be required to... do
with regard to your privacy - and this is everything, from your health
to your financial situation to everything else - is say 'we are going to
stick it to you.' Consumers, investors and the American public will
have no protection [of] their privacy whatsoever under this bill."How
could Ms. Kelly's "greatest expansion of personal financial privacy in
... history" be Mr. Dingell's privacy sham? Because, the legislation,
4 145 CONG. REC. H11513 (November 4, 1999) (statement of Rep. Sue
Kelly).
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while allowing consumers to "opt-out" of most sharing of non-public
personal information with unaffiliated third parties, made the
opportunity to opt-out less useful for consumers. It did this by
allowing affiliations among entities that used to be unaffiliated.
These include entities that collect the sensitive personal information a
consumer would want to protect the most; as well as entities that
offer, or deny, critically important services to consumers. In other
words, G-L-B's privacy provisions are almost illusory. The Act tears
down the walls that separate insurance companies, banks and the
securities industry, but its privacy provisions fail to regulate the
movement of personal financial information among those companies,
because they would be affiliates.
Many in the financial services industry argued that the
legislation imposed privacy protections where before there were none.
This, they argued, meant that the legislation was an improvement over
the status quo. But, in reality, the status quo was not an option in the
context of this legislation. Facilitating the creation of new financial
services conglomerates was at the very heart of the bill. Moreover,
the status quo, with respect to privacy, is not an option for society in
general. Advances in technology have taken the status quo off the
table. Where yesterday, collecting and sharing vast amounts of
personal financial information was time-consuming, expensive, and
impractical for a bank, today it can be done at point and click speed.
In addition, there is arguably a greater financial incentive to share the
information today than there was in the distant past.
III. PROTECTION OF FINANCIAL PRIVACY IN EXISTING
LAW
5
Financial privacy was protected, to a limited degree, prior to
the Gramm-Leach-Bliley legislation by a mix of state constitutional
provisions, laws and regulations, and by the federal Fair Credit
5 Much of the discussion in this section is based upon, L. RICHARD FISCHER,
THE LAW OF FINANCIAL PRIVACY, (Warren, Gorham & Lamont Banking/A.S. Pratt & Sons
Group, 1998) (on file with author).
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Reporting Act (FCRA). The FCRA regulates, to some extent, the
dissemination of financial information by some private businesses. It
allows credit-reporting agencies to disseminate information about a
person's credit, without consent, for a wide variety of purposes, and
gives consumers access to their credit reports to promote accuracy.
The FCRA also provides consumers access to information about those
who requested a credit report, and a process for settling disputes about
report accuracy.
In addition to the consumer protection laws, financial privacy
protections at the state level fall generally into three categories:
1. State constitutional privacy provisions.
These provisions are occasionally interpreted to bar
the sale, exchange or dissemination of non-public
personal financial information. For example, the
California Supreme Court in Valley Bank of Nevada v.
Superior Court, interpreted the state privacy
guarantee 7 to require a financial institution to notify its
customer and afford him an opportunity to object
before it could turn over the customer's financial
information to a third party in connection with
discovery in a civil case.8 However, most state
constitutional privacy guarantees are likely to be
interpreted as providing protection only with respect
to activities of the government, not the activities of
private parties.
2. State common law. Plaintiffs sometimes
cite state common law - particularly as it relates to
invasion of privacy, defamation, and implied contract
- to protect their financial privacy. However, tort
claims based on invasion of privacy and defamation
are seldom successful because mere disclosure of
6 Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1681 (1971).
7 CAL. CONST. art. 1, § I (Adopted in 1974, this amendment elevated the right
to privacy to an "inalienable right").
8 Valley Bank of Nevada v. Superior Court, 542 P.2d 977 (Cal. 1975).
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confidential information seldom satisfies the elements
of the tort. For example, evidence that the
information disseminated was true is a complete
defense to a defamation claim. 9 Customers argue,
with slightly more success, that banks have an implied
agreement with their customers to keep their financial
information confidential. For example, in Peterson v.
Idaho First National Bank, the Idaho Supreme Court
found that disclosure of the customer's deteriorating
finances to his employer violated an implied contract
between the bank and its customer that no such
information be disseminated without authorization.' 0
3. State financial privacy laws. Most state
financial privacy laws govern only disclosure to state
governmental entities. But, for example, Connecticut,
Illinois, Maine, and Maryland financial privacy laws
cover disclosure of certain financial information to
any person.
All of these protections have proven insufficient in the information
age.
IV. FINANCIAL PRIVACY PROTECTIONS IN THE GRAMM-
LEACH-BLILEY ACT
G-L-B does not require financial institutions to allow
consumers to opt out of sharing their personal information with
affiliates. It does require financial institutions to inform consumers of
the institution's privacy policies, and give consumers an opportunity
to opt-out of sharing their personal financial information with third
parties. I call it a "presumed consent" statute: if the consumer takes
no action, there is a presumption that the consumer consented to the
9 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 581 A.
10 Peterson v. Idaho First National Bank, 83 Idaho 578, 367 P.2d 284 (Idaho
1961).
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sharing of their personal information with third parties. This stands in
stark contrast to a "true consent" statute: the consumer's express
consent must be received before personal financial information is
shared. Financial institutions argued that a true consent statute would
be unworkable, and would deny financial institutions the synergies
that the legislation promised. Though, almost simultaneously,
Citibank - one of the leading proponents of the financial
modernization bill - agreed to protect the privacy of consumers in
Germany by adopting a true consent policy with respect to disclosure
of their personal information. However, Citibank offers no such
protection to Americans. Citibank's Agreement on Inter-territorial
Data Protection, which governs the sharing of personal financial
information between Citibank and its German credit card servicing
affiliates, indicates that personal financial information provided by the
affiliates would not be shared with third parties without express
consent of the German consumers.
As Senator Shelby put it during the debate on G-L-B, "Now, if
they can offer financial privacy to individuals in Germany, why on
God's green Earth can't they agree to an opt-in here in America? Do
Germans have special rights over Americans?" I would expect this
argument to gain prominence. The same objection is being made to
the Clinton Administration's proposal to implement the European
Union's data privacy initiative by giving Europeans more privacy
rights than are given Americans, across the board.
Incidentally, the Federal Communications Commission
successfully applies a true consent rule for dissemination of personal
account transaction information by telephone companies." As a
result, Bell Atlantic, for example, tells its customers, "We understand
that privacy is very important to all of our customers. So unless we
have your permission, Bell Atlantic does not share information about
your account - not even with our affiliates, such as Bell Atlantic
Mobile and Bell Atlantic Internet. . .. When we ask your permission,
we hope you'll give us the opportunity to help you make the most
11 See Telecommunications Carriers' Use of Customer Proprietary Network
Information and Other Customer Information, 63 Fed. Reg. 20, 326 (1998); see, e.g., U.S.
West, Inc. v. FCC and USA, 182 F. 3d 1224 (10th Cir. 1999).
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informed choices about your telephone needs." That privacy policy is
like a breath of fresh air.
V. IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PRIVACY PROTECTIONS IN
THE G-L-B
In looking at the implementation of G-L-B, I thought that
examining an existing privacy policy to see how it might be affected,
and how it should be affected by a financial privacy rule might be
useful. I do not mean to pick on one corporation, but let's use
Citibank as an example.
Here are some excerpts from its current, pre-G-L-B privacy
policy:
We will safeguard, according to strict
standards of security and confidentiality, any
information you share with us.12
That sounds nice, but must have been written by a lawyer. It is
absolutely true, I am sure. But, it is also absolutely meaningless.
What, precisely, are the "strict standards of security and
confidentiality" that Citicorp uses to protect information shared with
it?
We will limit the collection and use of any
such information to the minimum we require in order
to deliver you superior service, which includes
advising you about our products, services and other
opportunities, and to administer our business. 13
What does this mean? What information is being collected?
How is it being used? Does the phrase "administering our business"
include using information furnished to one affiliated entity - such as
12 Citicorp's privacy policy available at http://www.citibank.com/privacy/
(last visited Mar. 7, 2001).
13 id.
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a credit card servicing affiliate - to deny services 14 that could be
offered by another affiliated company, such as a life insurance
company? The privacy policy continues:
We will always maintain control over the
confidentiality of your information. We will,
however, facilitate relevant marketing and
promotional offers from reputable companies that
meet your needs. The companies are not permitted to
retain any of your information unless you have
specifically expressed interest in their products or
services.' 
5
This does not provide much protection at all. Citibank
implicitly asserts the authority to decide without any outside input
what a "reputable company" is and what "my needs" are. While,
hearing that these unnamed "reputable" companies are not permitted
to retain any of the unspecified information may seem comforting,
what if they do? There is no remedy for the consumer in this policy.
The policy also invites the consumer to go through his or her billing
statement and write or call Citibank to become excluded from these
offers. Citibank's privacy policy continues:
To alert you to special offers and provide you
with products and services that are tailored
specifically to you, our affiliates share information
about you on a confidential basis. Our affiliates are
permitted by law to share any information about their
16transactions or experiences with you.
14 ACLU and other civil libertarians expressed much more concern about the
denial of services based on unauthorized sharing of sensitive personal financial
information that was submitted in confidence, and about the basic privacy interest in
controlling dissemination of that information, than about the marketing of inferior or
over-priced products. Marketing is commercial speech, and to such speech we say: "Bring
it on!"
15 See Citicorp's privacy policy, supra note 13.
16 id.
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This sounds like the part of G-L-B Act, which Representative
Dingell must have been referring to as the "we're going to stick it to
you" part. If affiliates share information about a consumer, that
information is not "confidential." Well, maybe it is confidential in the
sense that it is kept secret from consumer! Moreover, most
consumers do not really know what "information about transactions
or experiences" really means. If a consumer was told that named
Citicorp affiliates will share the consumer's Certificates of Deposit
due dates and values, checking account balances, the amount of
money in their IRA account, the amount of the loan on their house
and the monthly payment, their credit card balances and purchases by
category of product or service, information about their large deposits
or withdrawals, and the amount of life insurance they have, then this
disclosure would be much more meaningful to the consumer, and
troubling. Moreover, this form of disclosure would make the sharing
of such personal financial information much less likely.
These examples point out the deficiencies in the privacy
policies that financial institutions have already voluntarily adopted.
We are hopeful that the regulations, that are eventually promulgated
to implement the privacy provisions in the G-L-B legislation, will not
permit such vague statements and promises; but, will instead afford
consumers meaningful notice about what information is collected,
how their personal financial information will be shared, and what they
can do to control such sharing.
VI. PROSPECTS FOR ADDITIONAL PRIVACY LEGISLATION
The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act is incomplete because it fails to
require true consent for dissemination of personal information to non-
affiliated companies, and does not allow a consumer to block the
sharing of personal information among affiliates. In addition, the
required privacy policy disclosures may well prove insufficient. For
these reasons, legislation has been introduced to remedy the perceived
defects. The leading bill in the 106 th Congress, the Consumer's Right
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to Financial Privacy Act (CRFP), 17 introduced by Reps. Edward
Markey (D-MA) and Joe Barton (R-TX) in the House, and Sens.
Richard Shelby (R-AL) and Richard Bryan (D-NV), would provide
for true consent for the sharing of personal financial information
among affiliates and non-affiliated companies. However, this
legislation, like G-L-B itself, lacks an adequate enforcement
mechanism. The CRFP does not explicitly allow a person who is
wronged by the sharing of their personal financial information to
bring suit independently and collect actual or liquidated damages and
attorney's fees. Instead, the legislation relies on the Federal Trade
Commission and state law enforcement officials to ensure
compliance. This is inconsistent with other federal privacy statutes,
such as the Driver's Privacy Protection Act 18 and the Video Privacy
Protection Act, both of which provide for a private right of action.' 9
Four things could work to spur financial privacy legislation as
the year winds down. First, the Administration is reportedly almost
ready to propose its own financial privacy bill. Proposed legislation
from the Clinton Administration would increase the visibility of the
issue, especially if the President chooses to take to the bully pulpit on
privacy. Second, state-based enforcement and legislative initiatives
could drive even some financial institutions to ask Congress to re-visit
the issue, and possibly occupy the field so as to pre-empt more
protective state laws. Financial privacy bills have been proposed in
the legislatures of 17 states. Certainty, clarity and consistency are
valuable to large financial institutions, and may, in some
circumstances, outweigh the business advantage of using a
consumer's financial information to market or deny services. Indeed,
in retrospect, the non-preemption amendment, which Senator Bryan
offered in the conference committee, to preserve the right of states to
add privacy protections to privacy floor established in G-L-B bill,
may prove even more important than the "opt-out" for sharing with
third parties. The ACLU National Office has drafted and distributed
to its affiliates and coalition partners a "model" state-level financial
7 H.R. 3320 and S. 1903.
18 18 U.S.C. § 2721-5 (1999).
'9 18 U.S.C. § 2710 (1999).
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privacy bill; we've urged activists around the country to attempt to
usher through such legislation this year. Third, a widely reported
privacy abuse by a large financial institution could spur financial
privacy legislation. Fourth, the upcoming elections are a potential
wildcard. Opinion polls indicate that privacy - especially financial
privacy and medical records privacy - are two of the issues that
voters care deeply about. The polls also suggest that informational
privacy, as against business interests, is of even greater concern than
information privacy as against governmental intrusion. If one
presidential candidate were to seize the privacy mantle, it could
become a potent political issue. However, neither of the leading
presidential candidates seems well-positioned to do that
CONCLUSION*
The quest for financial privacy is not a journey that will soon
end. For so long as Americans believe that their account balances and
transactions are personal information, this debate will continue, and
will occasionally flare up. To many, maintaining the privacy of the
intimate details of their lives is the essence of the struggle for human
dignity. We will continue with our efforts to promote reasonable
protections for sensitive personal information.
* Editor's note: No additional financial privacy legislation was enacted in the
10 6th Congress, which ended in November 2001. However, additional financial privacy
legislation is pending in the 107 th Congress. See Financial Privacy Protection Act 2001
S. 450, 107th Cong. (2001).
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